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Abstract
Signaling is an important topic in the study of asymmetric information in economic settings.
In particular, the transparency of information available to a seller in an auction setting is a
question of major interest. We introduce the study of signaling when conducting a second price
auction of a probabilistic good whose actual instantiation is known to the auctioneer but not
to the bidders. This framework can be used to model impressions selling in display advertising.
We establish several results within this framework. First, we study the problem of computing a
signaling scheme that maximizes the auctioneer’s revenue in a Bayesian setting. We show that
this problem is polynomially solvable for some interesting special cases, but computationally
hard in general. Second, we establish a tight bound on the minimum number of signals required
to implement an optimal signaling scheme. Finally, we show that at least half of the maximum
social welfare can be preserved within such a scheme.
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1 Introduction
A major concern in market design is to ensure that the markets are thick in the sense that there
is a sufficient volume of participants to produce the necessary level of competition for the market
to work well. Another concern is to design a practical language that is sufficiently expressive to
allow players to specify how much they value the goods in the market. In the market for diamonds
described by Levin and Milgrom [10] for example, the auctioneers could elicit bids for each individual
stone. However, the enormous effort required for the players to learn the value of each individual
stone and to submit individual bids would make the auction impractical. Moreover, bidding on
each stone separately can lead to the cherry-picking phenomenon, where very few customers are
interested in any one stone. This may lead to a situation where little revenue is generated although
the goods are valuable. In practice, stones are categorized into deals and then auctioned. This
method of treating different goods as identical is called conflation.
Milgrom [11] and Levin and Milgrom [10] provide a comprehensive analysis of the phenomenon
of conflation in various markets, with particular emphasis on online advertisement. In these mar-
kets, auctioning each good individually is usually not an option and conflation must be used. One
particular online market that we will focus on is the multibillion-dollar display advertisement mar-
ket, where publishers (such as MSN and Yahoo) attempt to maximize the revenue they collect
from the advertisers (say, Nike or Coca-Cola) for wisely targeting their ads at the right users. For
example, an ad referring to the surfing lifestyle on the sunny beaches of the Pacific Ocean may be
most valuable when targeted at a teenager from California; perhaps less so when targeted at a 10
year old from Oregon; and even less when targeted at older folks in areas that are far from the
ocean. However, it would be impossible for advertisers to decide how to bid on each individual
impression. Instead, the impressions are categorized based on attributes such as the time when the
impression was made, cookies in the user’s browser, certain demographic properties, geographic
location, etc.; impressions with similar attributes are then treated as instances of the same good.
In the context of display advertisement, the main question we deal with is: How should those
impressions be categorized in order to maximize the publisher’s revenue? The high-level idea behind
our model is to explore the natural asymmetry of information between the publisher and the adver-
tisers: while advertisers may know the distribution of users visiting a particular site, the publisher
usually has much more accurate information about each individual impression.1 Upon receiving an
impression, the publisher may choose to reveal to the advertisers certain attributes of this impres-
sion (say, age and gender), while concealing other attributes (say, geographic location). One may
argue that concealing information from the advertisers might generate inefficiencies in the market,
but the amount of information is typically so large that it would be impossible for the advertisers to
grasp everything anyhow. More importantly, ensuring that revenue is generated is essential for the
1In reality, the additional information about the visitor to a site is often handled by third party demand side
platform (usually refered as DSP) . For simplicity, we abstract away this distinction.
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proper functioning of markets. As described by Muthukrishnan [14], in Ad Exchanges, which are
systems that bring together publishers and advertisers in a common marketplace, ensuring good
revenue is vital to keeping publishers in the market.
More generally, our goal in this paper is to cope with the undesired effects of competition
deficiency on some items in an auction. To achieve this goal, we will exploit an inherent information
asymmetry between the auctioneer and the bidders that exists in many market settings. We model2
the auctioneer/bidders asymmetry by considering a framework termed a probabilistic single-item
auction, in which n bidders participate in an auction for a single item, which is chosen randomly
from a set ofm indivisible goods according to a commonly known probability distribution p ∈ ∆(m).
In contrast to the bidders, who know only the probability distribution over the possible goods, the
auctioneer knows its actual realization, and can use this informational superiority to increase the
collected revenue.
Specifically, the auctioneer may choose to reveal partial information to the bidders by means of
a signaling scheme. A signaling scheme is a (possibly randomized) policy that specifies some signal
σ revealed to the bidders upon the choice (made by nature) of each good j ∈ [m]. This policy
is known to the bidders who can therefore induce the revealed signal σ to update their perceived
probability for the chosen good j from p(j) to the “more accurate” p(j | σ).
One approach would be design an optimal auction from scratch for the problem of maximizing
revenue in a probabilistic single item auction setting. Since we are in a setting with very correlated
values, this is likely to produce contorted and impractical auctions in the style of the auction of
Cremer and McLean [2, 3], where full surplus extraction is possible. Instead, we focus on the
standard second price auction mechanism which is the de-facto standard for the sale of online
advertisement [22, 5, 14]. We believe this will generate an auction that is more relevant to practical
applications and that can be easily integrated with the current implementations.
In this auction, after the bidders receive the signal, they submit their bids, and the winner and
the payment are determined according to the second-price auction; namely, the winner is the bidder
with the highest bid and the payment is the second-highest bid. The goal of the auctioneer, which
is the subject of this paper, is to design a signaling scheme that maximizes her expected revenue.
A simple but crucial observation that facilitates our analysis is that, similar to the classical set-
ting of second-price auctions, here too, it is a dominant strategy for the bidders to reveal their true
expected valuations, where the expectation in this context is taken with respect to the conditional
probability p(j | σ). Therefore, the problem, termed revenue maximization by signaling, reduces
to finding a signaling scheme that maximizes the expected second-highest bid (amounting to the
expected revenue).
Two trivial signaling schemes are the one that reveals no information to the bidders and the one
2For the formal exposition of our model, see Section 2.
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that reveals the actual realization (all the information). Interestingly, there are instances in which
an appropriate signaling scheme provides a substantial improvement over the two trivial ones. This
can be demonstrated already through a special case of a signaling scheme, termed clustering : The
auctioneer a-priori partitions the set of goods into disjoint clusters, and the signal is the cluster
that contains the chosen good. Consider the case in which there are m bidders and m types of
goods, an item is chosen uniformly at random, and each bidder i is only interested in good i with
a unit valuation. If no information is revealed then the expected revenue is 1/m as the expected
valuation of each bidder is 1/m. If the actual realization is revealed, no revenue is collected since
for every realization, the second-highest valuation is 0. However, if the goods are partitioned into
clusters of size 2, then the expected revenue is 1/2, providing an improvement of a linear factor
over the best trivial scheme.
Note that clustering schemes can be thought of as restricting the auctioneer to deterministic
policies. The class of signaling schemes considered in this paper is more general than clustering as
we allow the auctioneer to toss coins when deciding on the revealed signal.
Our Results
We begin our analysis assuming that the valuations of the bidders are known to the auctioneer.
In this somewhat less realistic case, the problem of revenue maximization by signaling can be
formalized as a concise linear program and, as such, solved to optimality in polynomial time. A
natural question is to what extent the increase in revenue comes at the expense of social welfare.
Notably, we prove that a signaling scheme that obtains the optimal revenue can preserve at least
half of the optimal social welfare. In addition, it is shown that if the auctioneer is restricted to
invoking a signaling scheme by means of clustering, at least half of the optimal revenue can be
achieved, and this is tight.
Up until now we have assumed that the valuations of the bidders are known to the auctioneer.
However, in practice, the auctioneer rarely knows the bidders’ valuations. This motivates the
main technical contribution of this paper, namely, the study of a Bayesian setting, in which the
auctioneer holds probabilistic knowledge on the bidders’ valuations. We show that in this case the
revenue maximization by signaling problem becomes NP-hard. Still, in several cases of interest
the problem remains tractable even in the Bayesian setting. Finally, we show that m signals are
always sufficient to extract the optimal revenue. It is an interesting open problem how to find good
approximation algorithms for the cases where the revenue maximization is NP-hard or to prove
hardness of approximation in those cases.
Notice that our model captures the Bayesian knowledge on behalf of the auctioneer by assuming
a probability distribution over finitely many valuation matrices. This representation can capture
complicated dependencies between the different valuations, however it may exhibit plenty of redun-
dancy when the valuations are assumed to be independent. As such, it will be interesting to study
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our framework under more concise representations – for example, where each entry of the matrix
is sampled independently from some distribution.
Related Work
There is a rich theory on markets with information asymmetry. In such markets, agents on one
side have more (or better) information than those on the other side. The foundation of this theory
dates back to the work of Akerlof, Spence, and Stiglitz on the analysis of markets with asymmetric
information, which earned them the 2001 Nobel Prize. In particular, Akerlof [1] introduced the
first formal analysis of markets in which sellers have more information than buyers regarding the
quality of products. Spence [18, 19] demonstrated that in certain settings, well-informed agents
can improve their outcome by signaling their private information to poorly informed agents.
There is also a vast literature on the nature and effects of information revelation in auctions.
One of the most fundamental results in auction theory, namely the “Linkage Principle” of Milgrom
and Weber [12], states that the expected revenue of an auctioneer is enhanced when bidders are
provided with more information. While this work advocates transparency in various markets, later
work observed that such transparency may not be optimal in general (see, e.g., [17, 24, 21, 7]). More
recent work [11, 10] advocated the need for careful grouping of goods as an important market design
principle. Our work may be viewed as a study of information revelation through an optimization
lens, since we seek to maximize the expected revenue of an auctioneer by designing an effective
information revelation scheme.
Notice that Myerson’s classic result on revenue maximization [15] does not apply to our model
due to the asymmetry of information. Also, Myerson’s mechanism works only for single parameter
settings. Our Bayesian models are multi-parameter and are typically highly correlated. Revenue
maximization results for correlated valuations [16, 4] also do not apply here due to asymmetric
information. One could try to reveal all information and then apply one of those mechanisms, but
we would get a rather contorted auction, with no guarantees against our auction. In fact, it is easy
to construct examples where this generates arbitrary less revenue than our signaling scheme. Our
auction, on the other hand, is very practical and close to what is actually implemented in online
advertising markets.
Closer to our work is that of Ghosh et al [9], which studies revenue-maximizing clustering
schemes under a second-price auction in a setting with full information and additive valuations.
While this setting is different from our framework of signaling in a probabilistic item auction,
the mathematical formulation of the optimization problem in their setting is a special case of our
optimization problem, i.e., the case where the valuation matrix is known to the auctioneer and
the signaling scheme is restricted to take the form of a clustering scheme. Our focus, though, is
on the more realistic Bayesian case which is not not treated in [9]. In addition, our framework
relies on signaling that can be viewed as a “fractional” clustering, which is more powerful. Indeed,
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while Ghosh et al. show that it is strongly NP-hard to compute the optimal clustering scheme, an
optimal signaling scheme can be computed in polynomial time. Results of the similar flavour of
the ones in [9] were re-derived independently in a previous version of the current paper [6].
Independently of our work, Miltersen and Sheffet [13] also analyze the problem of obtaining
optimal signaling schemes for revenue maximization using Linear Programming, obtaining a result
similar to our Theorem 3.2.
2 The Model
In this section, we introduce the auctioning model on top of which our signaling schemes are
defined. Our focus in this paper is on a Bayesian setting, treating the uncertainty of the auctioneer
regarding the bidders’ valuations in a probabilistic manner. For clarity of the exposition, we shall
first consider the (less realistic) known-valuations setting, where no such uncertainty is assumed.
Known-Valuations Probabilistic Single-Item Auctions
A known-valuations probabilistic single-item auction (KPSA) A is formally depicted by the four-
tuple
A = 〈n,m, p, V 〉 ,
where n ∈ Z>0 stands for the number of bidders, m ∈ Z>0 stands for the number of distinct
indivisible goods, p ∈ ∆(m) is a probability distribution over the goods, and V ∈ Rn×m≥0 is a non-
negative real matrix capturing the valuation V (i, j) of bidder i for good j. A single good j ∈ [m]
is chosen (by nature) according to the distribution p which is a common knowledge.
The auction is conducted according to the second-price rule: Each player i places her bid bi and
the chosen good j is sold to the bidder that placed the highest bid maxi∈[n]{bi} (ties are broken
arbitrarily) for the price of the second highest bid max2i∈[n]{bi}.
Signaling Schemes
Although the bidders know the distribution p, they do not know its actual realization which is
observed only by the auctioneer. In an attempt to increase her expected revenue, the auctioneer
may partially reveal the realization j ∈ [m] of p to the bidders. This partial revelation is carried out
by means of signaling : given that the chosen good is j (recall that this choice is made by nature),
the auctioneer sends the bidders some signal σ; the bidders then hold a “more accurate picture” of
the chosen good that corresponds to the probability distribution p conditioned on σ. The policy
that dictates the signal that the auctioneer reveals to the bidders for each good j ∈ [m] is referred
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to as a signaling scheme. It is important to point out that this policy is decided by the auctioneer
and reported to the bidders prior to nature’s random choice of item j.
More formally, a signaling scheme is given by a set of s ∈ Z>0 signals and a signaling function
S : [s]× [m]→ [0, 1] that satisfies ∑
σ∈[s]
S(σ, j) = 1 ∀j ∈ [m] . (1)
Given that nature chose good j ∈ [m], the auctioneer reveals signal σ ∈ [s] to the bidders with
probability S(σ, j). It will be convenient to use the notation S to address the signaling scheme as
well as its inherent signaling function.
Once again, it is assumed that S (and s) are decided by the auctioneer and reported to the
bidders prior to the random choice of j; it is the actual signal σ (determined according to S) that
is revealed to the bidders after the choice of j. (This can be thought of as a commitment of the
auctioneer to stick to the signaling scheme that it previously reported.) Upon receiving signal σ,
the bidders, knowing p and S, update their belief from P(chosen good is j) = p(j) to
P(chosen good is j | signal is σ) =
P(signal is σ | chosen good is j) · P(chosen good is j)
P(signal is σ)
=
S(σ, j) · p(j)∑
j′∈[m] S(σ, j
′) · p(j′)
.
For succinctness, we will subsequently denote the events “chosen good is j” and “signal is σ” by j
and σ, respectively (our intention will be clear from the context).
Before we proceed, let us consider the restricted variant of a deterministic auctioneer which
is not allowed to use randomness when determining which signal to reveal. This is equivalent to
imposing an additional “integrality” requirement on the signaling scheme: S(σ, j) ∈ {0, 1} for every
σ ∈ [s] and j ∈ [m]. In other words, each signal σ ∈ [s] now corresponds to a cluster Cσ ⊆ [m] so
that the clusters are pairwise disjoint and
⋃
σ∈[s]Cσ = [m]. Following this view, the general case
(under which the auctioneer may use randomness when determining the signal) can be interpreted
as a fractional clustering of the goods, where S(σ, j) is the fraction of good j in cluster Cσ.
It is well known that in the classical setting of second-price single-item auctions, it is a dominant
strategy for the bidders to be truthful, i.e., to bid their true valuations [23]. It turns out that
this remains valid in probabilistic single-item auctions under signaling as well, as the following
observation demonstrates (proof deferred to the appendix).
Observation 2.1. For every i ∈ [n] and σ ∈ [s], bidding bi(σ) = E[V (i, j) | σ] in response to the
signal σ is a dominant strategy for bidder i.
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Optimization Problems
Consider some KPSA A = 〈n,m, p, V 〉 and signaling scheme S. In light of Observation 2.1, we
subsequently assume that the bidders are indeed truthful, that is, bidder i bids E[V (i, j) | σ] =∑
j∈[m] P(j | σ) · V (i, j) in response to the signal σ. Therefore, the (expected) revenue of the
auctioneer, denoted RevA(S), is given by
RevA(S) =
∑
σ∈[s]
P(σ) ·max2i∈[n]
∑
j∈[m]
P(j | σ) · V (i, j)
 .
This raises the following optimization problem, referred to as the revenue maximization by signaling
(RMS) problem: given a KPSA A, construct the signaling scheme S that maximizes RevA(S). One
may also be interested in the (expected) social welfare resulting from signaling scheme S, defined
as
SWA(S) =
∑
σ∈[s]
P(σ) ·maxi∈[n]
∑
j∈[m]
P(j | σ) · V (i, j)
 .
When A is clear form the context, we may omit it from the subscript and write simply Rev(S)
and SW(S).
Notice that the revenue of the auctioneer can be rewritten as
Rev(S) =
∑
σ∈[s]
P(σ) ·max2i∈[n]
∑
j∈[m]
P(σ | j) · P(j)
P(σ)
· V (i, j)

=
∑
σ∈[s]
max2i∈[n]
∑
j∈[m]
S(σ, j) · p(j) · V (i, j)

=
∑
σ∈[s]
max2i∈[n]
∑
j∈[m]
S(σ, j) ·Ψ(i, j)
 , (2)
where Ψ(i, j) = p(j) · V (i, j) is referred to as the normalized valuation of bidder i for item j.
Following the same line of arguments, we can also rewrite the social welfare as
SW(S) =
∑
σ∈[s]
maxi∈[n]
∑
j∈[m]
S(σ, j) ·Ψ(i, j)
 .
Under the deterministic auctioneer requirement, the RMS problem turns into the following
clustering problem: Given the normalized valuation matrix Ψ ∈ Rn×m≥0 , devise a pairwise disjoint
partition of [m] into clusters {Cσ}σ∈[s] that maximizes
Rev
(
{Cσ}σ∈[s]
)
=
∑
σ∈[s]
max2i∈[n]
∑
j∈Cσ
Ψ(i, j)
 .
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A Bayesian Setting
Recall that up until now, we assumed that the valuations of the bidders are known to the auction-
eer.3 However, in many practical scenarios the auctioneer does not know the exact valuation of
each bidder. To tackle this obstacle, we assume a Bayesian setting, treating the state of knowledge
that the auctioneer holds on the bidders’ valuations in a probabilistic manner. This is captured in
our model by considering k ∈ Z>0 distinct valuation matrices V1, . . . , Vk ∈ R
n×m
≥0 and a probability
distribution q ∈ ∆(k) associating each valuation matrix Vℓ with the probability q(ℓ) that it occurs.
A probabilistic single-item auction (PSA) is then depicted by the 6-tuple
A =
〈
n,m, k, p, q, {Vℓ}ℓ∈[k]
〉
,
where n ∈ Z>0, m ∈ Z>0, and p ∈ ∆(m) have the same role as in the known-valuations case; and
k ∈ Z>0, q ∈ ∆(k), and
{
Vℓ ∈ R
n×m
≥0
}
ℓ∈[k]
capture the aforementioned Bayesian angle.
The expected revenue of the auctioneer from the signaling scheme S is now defined to be
RevA(S) =
∑
ℓ∈[k]
q(ℓ)
∑
σ∈[s]
P(σ) ·max2i∈[n]
∑
j
P(j | σ) · Vℓ(i, j)

=
∑
ℓ∈[k]
q(ℓ)
∑
σ∈[s]
max2i∈[n]
∑
j
S(σ, j) ·Ψℓ(i, j)
 ,
where Ψℓ(i, j) = p(j) · Vℓ(i, j) and the last equation follows from the same line of arguments that
was used to establish (2).
3 Optimal Signaling Schemes — The Known-Valuations Case
Let us start our technical treatment of signaling schemes with (the simpler) known-valuations
setting, considering a KPSA A = 〈n,m, p, V 〉. We show that an optimal signaling scheme for A
can be obtained by solving an LP with O(n2m) variables and O(n2+m) constraints (excluding the
non-negativity constraints).
Given an s-signal signaling scheme S for A and a signal σ ∈ [s], let hS1 (σ) and h
S
2 (σ) denote the
bidders i that realize maxi∈[n]
{∑
j∈[m] S(σ, j) ·Ψ(i, j)
}
and max2i∈[n]
{∑
j∈[m] S(σ, j) ·Ψ(i, j)
}
,
respectively. (When the signaling scheme S is clear from the context, we may omit the superscripts.)
Our concise LP relies on the following observation.
Observation 3.1. There exists an optimal s-signal signaling scheme S for A such that given
σ, σ′ ∈ [s], if hS1 (σ) = h
S
1 (σ
′) and hS2 (σ) = h
S
2 (σ
′), then σ = σ′.
3In some sense, we also assumed that the valuations of each bidder are known to the other bidders. However,
Observation 2.1 implies that this does not matter: a bidder is better off bidding its true (expected) valuation regardless
of the strategies of the other bidders.
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Proof. Consider an optimal s-signal signaling scheme S that minimizes s. We argue that S must
satisfy the assertion. To that end, assume by contradiction that there are two distinct signals
σ, σ′ ∈ [s] such that hS1 (σ) = h
S
1 (σ
′) = i1 and h
S
2 (σ) = h
S
2 (σ
′) = i2. Let S
∗ be the (s − 1)-signal
signaling scheme obtained from S by replacing both signals σ and σ′ by a new signal σ∗ defined by
setting S(σ∗, j) = S(σ, j) + S(σ′, j) for every j ∈ [m].
It is easy to verify that S∗ is valid in terms of (1). Moreover, since hS
∗
1 (σ
∗) = i1 and h
S∗
2 (σ
∗) = i2,
we can use (2) to conclude that the combined contribution of σ and σ′ to Rev(S) is∑
j∈[m]
(
S(σ, j) + S(σ′, j)
)
·Ψ(i2, j) =
∑
j∈[m]
S∗(σ∗, j) ·Ψ(i2, j)
which is precisely the contribution of σ∗ to Rev(S∗). Thus, Rev(S) = Rev(S∗), in contradiction
to the minimality of s.
A direct corollary of Observation 3.1 is that it suffices to consider signaling schemes with
s = n(n−1) signals — each signal σ is uniquely identified by h1(σ) and h2(σ). This turns out to be
asymptotically tight as there are examples showing that Ω(n2) signals are required to implement
an optimal signaling scheme (see Section 5). Based on Observation 3.1 and on the formulation
of revenue in (2), we can construct an optimal signaling scheme S by solving the following linear
program, denoted LP1:
max
∑
i1,i2∈[n],i1 6=i2
R(σi1,i2) s.t.
R(σi1,i2) ≤
∑
j∈[m]
S(σi1,i2 , j) ·Ψ(i1, j) ∀i1, i2 ∈ [n], i1 6= i2
R(σi1,i2) =
∑
j∈[m]
S(σi1,i2 , j) ·Ψ(i2, j) ∀i1, i2 ∈ [n], i1 6= i2∑
i1,i2∈[n],i1 6=i2
S(σi1,i2 , j) = 1 ∀j ∈ [m]
S(σi1,i2 , j) ≥ 0 ∀i1, i2 ∈ [n], i1 6= i2,∀j ∈ [m] .
Since LP1 consists of O(n2m) variables and O(n2+m) constraints (excluding the non-negativity
constraints), it can be solved in polynomial time.
Theorem 3.2. Under the known-valuations setting, the RMS problem can be solved in polynomial
time.
Signaling versus Clustering
A clustering scheme is a special case of a signaling scheme, where the auctioneer cannot use ran-
domness (see Section 2). This restricted case has been studied in [9], and is equivalent to imposing
the requirement that S(σ, j) ∈ {0, 1} for every σ and j in our framework.
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Theorem 3.3. The optimal revenue that can be extracted by a signaling scheme is at most twice
the optimal revenue that can be extracted by a clustering scheme, and this is tight.
Proof. The algorithm in [9] produces a clustering scheme that extracts revenue that is greater or
equal to half of
min
i′
∑
j
max
i 6=i′
Ψ(i, j). (3)
Therefore, in order to establish the upper bound, it is sufficient to show that the revenue extracted
by any signaling scheme is bounded by Equation (3). For every i′ ∈ [n], one can express the revenue
of a signaling scheme S as
Rev(S) =
∑
σ
max2i
∑
j
S(σ, j)Ψ(i, j)
≤
∑
σ
max
i 6=i′
∑
j
S(σ, j)Ψ(i, j)
≤
∑
σ
∑
j
S(σ, j)max
i 6=i′
Ψ(i, j)
=
∑
j
max
i 6=i′
Ψ(i, j) ,
where the last equality holds since
∑
σ S(σ, j) = 1. The upper bound follows.
To establish the lower bound, consider Example 5.3. While the optimal signaling scheme ex-
tracts revenue n(n+1) , it is not difficult to verify that the optimal clustering scheme partitions items
1, . . . ,m into pairs and leaves item 0 as a singleton. This clustering scheme extracts revenue n2(n+1) ,
which is half of the revenue extracted by the optimal signaling scheme.
We remark that while we used Equation (3) as our benchmark, a better benchmark would be
to compare the clustering revenue to the solution of the LP in Theorem 3.2. However, Example 5.3
demonstrates that 12 is tight with respect to this benchmark as well.
Social Welfare versus Revenue
Increasing the revenue by signaling usually comes at the expense of degrading the social welfare.
We show, however, that it is easy to calculate the best revenue one can get without degrading
the social welfare by much. For every j ∈ [m], let µ(j) denote the bidder i that maximizes the
normalized valuation Ψ(i, j) (which means that i also maximizes V (i, j)). Then, the optimal social
welfare is given by W ∗ =
∑
j∈[m]Ψ(µ(j), j). By augmenting LP1 with the constraint∑
i1,i2∈[n],i1 6=i2
∑
j∈[m]
S(σi1,i2 , j) ·Ψ(i1, j) ≥ βW
∗ ,
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we guarantee the highest possible revenue conditioned on preserving at least a β-fraction of the
social welfare. Theorem 3.4 (whose proof is deferred to the appendix) shows that taking β ≤ 1/2
does not affect LP1. Note that this theorem can be viewed as a signaling analogue of Theorem 2
in [9] and its proof essentially follows similar arguments.
Theorem 3.4. There exists a revenue-optimal signaling scheme S with SW(S) ≥W ∗/2.
4 Optimal Signaling Schemes — The Bayesian Case
We now turn to discuss the more interesting Bayesian setting, considering a PSAA =
〈
n,m, k, p, q, {Vℓ}ℓ∈[k]
〉
,
where q is a probability distribution over the valuation matrices V1, . . . , Vk ∈ R
n×m
≥0 . Our goal in this
section is twofold: (1) proving that the RMS problem under the Bayesian setting is NP-hard; and
(2) presenting poly-time algorithms when k or m are fixed. Note that the RMS problem remains
NP-hard if n is fixed as long as both k and m are free parameters.
Tractable Special Cases
Let us start with developing an efficient algorithm for the RMS problem assuming that k = O(1)
(without any restriction on n or m). Consider some s-signal signaling scheme S for A. Given
a Bayesian outcome ℓ ∈ [k] and a signal σ ∈ [s], let hS1 (ℓ, σ) and h
S
2 (ℓ, σ) denote the bidders
i that realize maxi∈[n]
{∑
j∈[m] S(σ, j) ·Ψℓ(i, j)
}
and max2i∈[n]
{∑
j∈[m] S(σ, j) ·Ψℓ(i, j)
}
, respec-
tively. (When the signaling scheme S is clear from the context, we may omit the superscripts.)
Using this notation, we can now state the following observation which is established by repeating
the line of arguments that led to Observation 3.1.
Observation 4.1. There exists an optimal s-signal signaling scheme S for A such that given
σ, σ′ ∈ [s], if hS1 (ℓ, σ) = h
S
1 (ℓ, σ
′) and hS2 (ℓ, σ) = h
S
2 (ℓ, σ
′) for every ℓ ∈ [k], then σ = σ′.
Observation 4.1 implies that it is sufficient to consider O(n2k) signals σ, each uniquely identified
by h1(1, σ), h2(1, σ), . . . , h1(k, σ), h2(k, σ). In order to formulate it as a concise linear program, we
fix
Λ =
{〈
(i11, i
1
2), . . . , (i
k
1 , i
k
2)
〉
| iℓh ∈ [n]∀h ∈ {1, 2}, ℓ ∈ [k] ∧ i
ℓ
1 6= i
ℓ
2 ∀ℓ ∈ [k]
}
.
An optimal signaling scheme S can now be constructed by solving the following linear program,
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denoted LP2:
max
∑
λ∈Λ
R(σλ) s.t.
R(σλ) ≤
∑
ℓ∈[k]
q(ℓ)
∑
j∈[m]
S(σλ, j) ·Ψℓ(λ(ℓ, 1), j) ∀λ ∈ Λ
R(σλ) =
∑
ℓ∈[k]
q(ℓ)
∑
j∈[m]
S(σλ, j) ·Ψℓ(λ(ℓ, 2), j) ∀λ ∈ Λ∑
λ∈Λ
S(σλ, j) = 1 ∀j ∈ [m]
S(σλ, j) ≥ 0 ∀λ ∈ Λ,∀j ∈ [m] .
Since LP2 consists of O(n2km) variables and O(n2k + m) constraints (excluding the non-
negativity constraints), it can be solved in polynomial time as long as k is constant.
Theorem 4.2. If k is fixed, then the RMS problem can be solved in polynomial time.
Next, we show how to compute an optimal s-signal signaling scheme S whenm = O(1) (without
any restriction on k and n). The main ingredient for this will be the following lemma (refer to [20]
for a proof).
Lemma 4.3. The number of distinct regions with non-empty interior4 defined by t ≥ m hyperplanes
in Rm is bounded from above by the Whitney number W (m, t) =
∑m
i=0
(
t
i
)
= O(tm).
Given some λ ∈ Λ, we define Xλ to be the region that contains every vector x ∈ R
m
≥0−{0} such
that ∑
j∈[m]
x(j) ·Ψℓ (λ(ℓ, 1), j) ≥
∑
j∈[m]
x(j) ·Ψℓ (λ(ℓ, 2), j) ≥
∑
j∈[m]
x(j) ·Ψℓ (i, j) (4)
for every ℓ ∈ [k] and i /∈ {λ(ℓ, 1), λ(ℓ, 2)}. The key observation here is that if two signals σ, σ′ ∈ [s]
are such that their corresponding vectors S(σ, ·),S(σ, ·) ∈ Rm≥0 fall into the same region Xλ, λ ∈ Λ,
then we can merge them without decreasing the revenue. Therefore, if we can come up with a
poly-size subset Λ′ ⊆ Λ so that the regions in {Xλ | λ ∈ Λ
′} cover the entire Rm≥0 − {0}, then we
can construct an optimal signaling scheme by picking one signal (the right one) for each region Xλ
such that λ ∈ Λ′.
So, how can we come up with such a subset Λ′ ⊆ Λ? It turns out that although there are many
regions Xλ, only a polynomially small subset of them have a non-empty interior. Indeed, the total
number of linear constraints (4) involved in the definition of the regions Xλ, λ ∈ Λ, is n
2k (each
linear constraint is of the form
∑
j∈[m] x(j) ·Ψℓ(i, j) ≥
∑
j∈[m] x(j) ·Ψℓ(i
′, j) for some i, i′ ∈ [n] and
ℓ ∈ [k]). Since those linear constraints correspond to hyperplanes in Rm, Lemma 4.3 guarantees
that there are O((n2k)m) regions Xλ with a non-empty interior.
Once the subset Λ′ ⊆ Λ of regions with non-empty interior has been identified, providing the
linear constraints of (4) for each such region, we can rewrite LP2, dedicating a single signal σ to
4A region R ∈ Rm is said to have a non-empty interior if it contains an m-dimensional open set.
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each region Xλ such that λ ∈ Λ
′ (the vector S(σ, ·) takes the role of the vector x in (4)). The
resulting linear program consists of O(|Λ′| ·m) variables and O(|Λ′| · kn) constraints, thus it can be
solved in polynomial time.
It remains to show that we can efficiently enumerate the collection of regions with non-empty
interiors. This is carried out by recursion on k: When k = 1, we can simply iterate through all the
regions and check if their interior is non-empty. For the recursive step, observe that if the region
Xλ has an empty interior, then clearly, so does the region Xλ◦(ik+1
1
,ik+1
2
) for every i
k+1
1 , i
k+1
2 ∈ [n].
Therefore, we can keep iterating only through those regions that had a non-empty interior in the
previous recursive level. By Lemma 4.3, the whole process requires checking n(n−1)·O((n2(k−1))m)
regions.
Theorem 4.4. If m is fixed, then the RMS problem can be solved in polynomial time.
Hardness of the General Case
Finally, we establish the NP-completeness of (the decision version of) the RMS problem in the
Bayesian setting for the case n = 3. The inclusion of this problem in NP follows from Theorem 5.2
that ensures that it suffices to consider signaling schemes with at mostm signals (which also implies
that the number of bits required to represent the solutions of the LP is polynomial).
The remainder of the section is dedicated to proving that the RMS problem in the Bayesian
setting is NP-hard. This is done by a reduction from MAX-CUT (problem ND16 in [8]): Given
a graph G = (V,E) and two vertices x, y ∈ V , the MAX-CUT problem asks for the maximum
integer k such that there exists a vertex subset U ⊆ V , |{x, y} ∩ U | = 1, with at least k edges
crossing between U and V − U . Given such an instance of MAX-CUT, assuming that |V | = n
and |E| = m, we construct a PSA A with 3 bidders, n items (associated with the vertices in V ),
and 2n +m − 3 Bayesian outcomes. It will be convenient to associate the Bayesian outcomes as
follows: each 2 ≤ ℓ ≤ n − 1 is associated with some vertex u ∈ V − {x, y}; each n ≤ ℓ ≤ 2n − 3 is
also associated with some vertex u ∈ V − {x, y}; each 2n− 2 ≤ ℓ ≤ 2n +m− 3 is associated with
some edge (u, v) ∈ E. Figure 1 depicts the values of Φℓ(i, j) = q(ℓ) ·Ψℓ(i, j) for every i ∈ {1, 2, 3},
j ∈ [n], and ℓ ∈ [2n +m − 3], where K1 ≫ K2 ≫ 1 are integers that will be determined in the
course of the proof. This specifies everything we need for the reduction.
Suppose that the solution to the MAX-CUT instance is C∗ and that this is realized by the
vertex subset X ⊆ V , where x ∈ X and y ∈ Y = V − X. We design a signaling scheme S with
two signals σx, σy such that S(σx, u) =
{
1 if u ∈ X
0 if u ∈ Y
and S(σy, u) =
{
0 if u ∈ X
1 if u ∈ Y
. It can be
checked that the revenue generated by this signaling scheme is
∑
ℓ∈[2n+m−3]
∑
σ∈{σx,σy}
max2i∈{1,2,3}
{∑
u∈V
Φℓ(i, u) · S(σ, u)
}
= 2K1 + (n− 2)K2 +m+ C
∗ .
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s t
1 K1
2 K1
3 K1 K1
(a) ℓ = 1
s u
1 K2
2 K2
3
(b) 2 ≤ ℓ ≤ n− 1
t u
1 K2
2 K2
3
(c) n ≤ ℓ ≤ 2n− 3
u v
1 1
2 1
3 1 1
(d) 2n−2 ≤ ℓ ≤ 2n+m−3
Figure 1: Representation of the mapping from MAX-CUT to Bayesian signaling. The tables
represent Φℓ(i, v) for v ∈ V and i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Values not specified in the tables are zero.
The reduction is completed by showing that this is an upper bound on the revenue generated by
any signaling scheme.
Consider some s-signal signaling scheme S. The revenue of S is
Rev(S) =
∑
ℓ∈[2n+m−3]
∑
σ∈[s]
max2i∈{1,2,3}
{∑
u∈V
Φℓ(i, u) · S(σ, u)
}
= K1
∑
σ∈[s]
max{S(σ, x),S(σ, y)}
+K2
∑
u∈V−{x,y}
∑
σ∈[s]
[min{S(σ, x),S(σ, u)} +min{S(σ, y),S(σ, u)}]
+
∑
(u,v)∈E
∑
σ∈[s]
max{S(σ, u),S(σ, v)} . (5)
We argue that if S is optimal, then for each signal σ, either S(σ, x) = 0 or S(σ, y) = 0. Indeed, if
there is a signal σ with S(σ, x) and S(σ, y) simultaneously positive, then we can split this signal
into two signals σ′, σ′′ such that S(σ′, x) = S(σ, x) and S(σ′, u) = 0 for u 6= x; S(σ′′, x) = 0 and
S(σ′′, u) = S(σ, u) for u 6= x. Taking K1 to be sufficiently large ensures that the revenue increases
following this transformation.
Now, consider a signal σ ∈ [s] with S(σ, x) > 0. If there exists some u 6= x such that S(σ, u) >
S(σ, x), then there must exists a signal σ′ ∈ [s] such that S(σ′, u) < S(σ′, x) since
∑
σ∈[s] S(σ, x) =∑
σ∈[s] S(σ, u) = 1. Therefore, we can increase the value of S(σ
′, u) and decrease the value of
S(σ, u) by a small value δ, obtaining a valid signaling scheme with larger revenue (this is due to the
fact that K2 is large compared to 1). Similarly, we can claim that in an optimal signaling scheme, a
signal σ ∈ [s] with S(σ, y) > 0 has S(σ, u) ≤ S(σ, y) for all u ∈ V . The same argument also implies
that for each signal σ that has positive probability, either S(σ, x) > 0 or S(σ, y) > 0.
Consider a signal σ and let x = u0, u1, . . . , uk ∈ V be the items with positive S(σ, ui). Assume
without loss of generality that S(σ, u0) ≥ S(σ, u1) ≥ · · · ≥ S(σ, uk) > S(σ, uk+1) = 0. Now,
split signal σ in k + 1 signals σ0, σ1, . . . , σk such that S(σi, s) = S(σi, u1) = · · · = S(σ
i, ui) =
S(σ, ui) − S(σ, ui+1). By substituting the split signals into (5), we conclude that the revenue is
kept unchanged.
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Therefore, PSA instances produced by our reduction always admit an optimal s-signal signaling
scheme S such that for every signal σ ∈ [s], there exist a vertex subset Uσ ⊆ V and a real 0 < pσ ≤ 1
satisfying:
(1) |Uσ ∩ {x, y}| = 1;
(2) S(σ, u) = pσ for every u ∈ Uσ;
(3) S(σ, u) = 0 for every u /∈ Uσ;
(4)
∑
σ:v∈Uσ
pσ = 1 for every v ∈ V ; and
(5)
∑
σ∈[s] pσ =
∑
σ:x∈Uσ
pσ +
∑
σ:y∈Uσ
pσ = 2. This is employed in order to prove that Rev(S) ≤
2K1+(n−2)K2+m+C
∗. From (5), we see thatRev(S) = 2K1+(n−2)K2+
∑
(u,v)∈E
∑
σ∈[s]max{S(σ, u),S(σ, v)},
so it remains to show that ∑
(u,v)∈E
∑
σ∈[s]
max{S(σ, u),S(σ, v)} ≤ m+ C∗ . (6)
To that end, note that every edge (u, v) ∈ E and signal σ ∈ [s] contribute pσ to the the left-hand
side in (6) if |{u, v} ∩ Uσ| ≥ 1; and 0 otherwise. Therefore, the left-hand side in (6) is equal to
∑
(u,v)∈E
1 + (1/2) ∑
σ:|{u,v}∩Uσ |=1
pσ
 = m+ ∑
σ∈[s]
pσ
2
|∂(Uσ)| ≤ m+ C
∗ ,
where ∂(U) is the set of edges with exactly one endpoint in U , and the last inequality follows since∑
σ∈[s]
pσ
2 = 1, hence
∑
σ∈[s]
pσ
2 |∂(Uσ)| can be viewed as the average size of cuts corresponding to
the vertex subsets Uσ, σ ∈ [s]. This establishes the following theorem.
Theorem 4.5. The decision version of the RMS problem in the Bayesian setting is NP-complete.
The problem is hard already for n = 3.
5 Bounding the Number of Signals
In a market with n bidders, the algorithm described in Section 3 generates a signaling scheme with
O(n2) signals. In fact, some instances might require that many signals in order to produce the
optimal signaling.
Example 5.1. Consider a KPSA with n2 − n items appearing with uniform probability. Each
item Ii,i′ is labeled with an ordered pair (i, i
′) of bidders, where V (i, Ii,i′) = 1, V (i
′, Ii,i′) =
1
2 , and
V (i′′, Ii,i′) = 0 for every i
′′ ∈ [n]−{i, i′}. The optimal signaling generates revenue of 34 , by emitting
a signal σi,i′ when either Ii,i′ or Ii′,i is chosen. Notice that s =
(
n
2
)
signals are required to implement
this signaling scheme. It is not hard to see that with fewer signals, it is impossible to achieve this
revenue.
The KPSA described in Example 5.1 has m = Ω(n2) items. Can we construct a similar bad
example with much fewer items? More generally, can we bound the minimum number of signals
required to implement an optimal signaling scheme as a function depending only on m?
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Theorem 5.2. Every PSA has an optimal signaling scheme with m signals.
Proof. For brevity, we establish the assertion assuming the known-valuations setting; the proof of
the Bayesian setting follows from the same line of arguments. Consider some KPSAA = 〈n,m, p, V 〉
and let S be an s-signal signaling scheme for A that minimizes s. Assume by contradiction that
s > m. Associate with each signal σ ∈ [s] a vector ~qσ ∈ R
m
≥0, where qσ(j) = S(σ, j) for every j ∈ [m].
We can rewrite the contribution of σ to the revenue of S as Rev(σ,S) = max2i∈[n]{
∑
j∈[m] qσ(j) ·
Ψ(i, j)}, so Rev(·,S) is a homogeneous, but not necessarily linear, operator.
Since s > m, the vector collection {~qσ | σ ∈ [s]} must exhibit linear dependencies. Therefore,
there must exist some reals x1, . . . , xr, xr+1, . . . , xt > 0 and signals σ1, . . . σr, σr+1, . . . , σt such that
x1~qσ1 + · · ·+ xr~qσr = xr+1~qσr+1 + · · ·+ xt~qσt .
Consider the s-signal signaling scheme S ′ defined by the modified signals σ′ obtained from S by
setting
~qσ′z =

(1 + ǫxz)~qσz if 1 ≤ z ≤ r
(1− ǫxz)~qσz if r + 1 ≤ z ≤ t
~qσz otherwise .
For any ǫ ∈
[
− 1max1≤z≤r{xz} ,
1
maxr+1≤z≤t{xz}
]
, the resulting signaling scheme S ′ is valid as
∑
σ′∈[s] ~qσ′ =∑
σ∈[s] ~qσ = 1 and ~qσ′ ≥ 0.
Now, notice that the revenue of the new signaling scheme satisfies
Rev(S ′) = Rev(S) + ǫ
[
r∑
z=1
xzRev(σz ,S)−
t∑
z=r+1
xzRev(σz,S)
]
.
Since S is optimal, it must be the case that
∑r
z=1 xzRev(σz,S)−
∑t
z=r+1 xzRev(σz,S) = 0 (recall
that ǫ can be taken to be positive or negative). Thus, we can take ǫ to be either − 1max1≤z≤r{xz} or
1
maxr+1≤z≤t{xz}
and get an optimal signaling scheme with less than s signals, in contradiction to the
choice of S.
If one can achieve revenue R with s signals, then it is trivial to see that with s′ ≤ s signals, one
can achieve revenue
⌊
s′
s
⌋
R. This turns out to be the best possible in some cases.
Example 5.3. Consider n + 1 items {0, 1, . . . , n}, each chosen with probability 1
n+1 and n + 1
bidders with valuations V (i, i) = 1 for i = 1, . . . , n, V (0, 0) = n, and V (i, j) = 0 otherwise. The
optimal signaling scheme S uses n signals σ1, . . . , σn such that S(σi, i) = 1 and S(σi, 0) =
1
n
for
i = 1, . . . , n and zero otherwise. The revenue of this scheme is n
n+1 . Now, for any s < n and an
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s-signal signaling scheme S ′, we have
Rev(S ′) =
∑
σ′∈[s]
max2i∈[n]
∑
j∈[m]
S ′(σ′, j) ·Ψ(i, j)

≤
∑
σ′∈[s]
maxi∈[n]−{0}
∑
j∈[m]
S ′(σ′, j) ·Ψ(i, j)

≤
∑
σ′∈[s]
1
n+ 1
=
s
n+ 1
.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Observation 2.1. Consider the known-valuations ex-ante game defined by setting the strat-
egy space of each bidder i ∈ [n] to be the collection of all possible functions bi : [s]→ R≥0 and the
utility of bidder i from strategy profile b = (b1, . . . , bn) to be the expected utility of bidder i in the
KPSA A assuming that each bidder adheres to b. Fix some (arbitrary) strategies bi′ : [s] → R≥0
for all bidders i′ 6= i and consider the strategy bi of bidder i that bids
bi(σ) = E [V (i, j) | σ] =
∑
j∈[m]
P(j | σ) · V (i, j) =
∑
j∈[m]
S(σ, j) · p(j)∑
j′∈[m] S(σ, j
′) · p(j′)
· V (i, j)
in response to each signal σ ∈ [s].
Fix some signal σ. From bidder i’s point of view, the expected valuation of the chosen good is
bi(σ), whereas each other bidder i
′ 6= i, bids bi′(sigma). If bidder i does not win the chosen good,
which happens only if maxi′ 6=i{bi′(σ)} ≥ bi(σ), then her utility in the ex-ante game is 0. This can
be changed only if bidder i increases her bid so that it exceeds maxi′ 6=i{bi′(σ)}, but this imposes
a negative utility on i. So, assume that maxi′ 6=i{bi′(σ)} ≤ bi(σ) and bidder i does win the chosen
good. By the definition of the second-price rule, the utility of i must be non-negative. Clearly,
bidder i has no incentive to increase her bid. Decreasing her bid does not change her utility as
long as it still exceeds maxi′ 6=i{bi′(σ)}; decreasing her bid further resets her utility to zero. The
assertion follows.
Proof of Theorem 3.4. Consider an optimal signaling scheme and let σ be a signal and j an item
such that S(σ, j) > 0. If µ(j) /∈ {hS1 (σ), h
S
2 (σ)}, then we construct the new signaling scheme Ŝ
obtained from S by replacing signal σ with the two new signals σ′, σ′′ such that Ŝ(σ′, j) = S(σ, j),
Ŝ(σ′, j′) = 0 for j′ 6= j; and Ŝ(σ′′, j) = 0, S(σ′′, j′) = S(σ, j′) for j′ 6= j.
We argue that Rev(Ŝ) ≥ Rev(S) which, by the optimality of S, implies that Rev(Ŝ) =
Rev(S). To that end, note that the contribution of σ to Rev(S) is
Rev(σ,S) = S(σ, j) ·Ψ(hS2 (σ), j) +
∑
j′ 6=j
S(σ, j′) ·Ψ(hS2 (σ), j
′)
≤ S(σ, j) ·Ψ(hS1 (σ), j) +
∑
j′ 6=j
S(σ, j′) ·Ψ(hS1 (σ), j
′) ,
whereas the contributions of σ′ and σ′′ to Rev(Ŝ) are
Rev(σ′, Ŝ) = S(σ, j) ·max2i∈[n] {Ψ(i, j)}
and
Rev(σ′′, Ŝ) = max2i∈[n]
∑
j′ 6=j
S(σ, j′) ·Ψ(i, j′)
 ,
i
respectively. The argument follows since
Rev(σ′, Ŝ) ≥ max
{
S(σ, j) ·Ψ(hS2 (σ), j),S(σ, j) ·Ψ(h
S
1 (σ), j)
}
and
Rev(σ′′, Ŝ) ≥ min
∑
j′ 6=j
S(σ, j′) ·Ψ(hS2 (σ), j
′),
∑
j′ 6=j
S(σ, j′) ·Ψ(hS1 (σ), j
′)
 .
It follows that there exists a revenue-optimal signaling scheme S such that S(σ, j) > 0 only if
µ(j) ∈ {h1(σ), h2(σ)}. Therefore, the social welfare of S satisfies
SW(S) =
∑
σ∈[s]
∑
j∈[m]
S(σ, j) ·Ψ(h1(σ), j)
≥
∑
σ∈[s]
∑
j∈[m]
S(σ, j) ·
Ψ(h1(σ), j) + Ψ(h2(σ), j)
2
≥
1
2
∑
σ∈[s]
∑
j∈[m]
S(σ, j) ·Ψ(µ(j), j) =
1
2
W ∗ .
The assertion follows.
ii
